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THE CASE FOR REVISITING CONTINGENT 
LIABILITIES UNDER ARTICLE VIII 
Joshua Hansen-King 
Abstract: Prior to 2012, Washington municipalities frequently relied on contingent-
liability  agreements  (“CLA”  or  “CLAs”)  to   reduce  borrowing  costs  because  such  liabilities  
did not constitute debt under article VIII of the Washington State Constitution. But the 
viability  of  CLAs  was  called  into  question  by  the  Washington  State  Supreme  Court’s  2012  
plurality decision in In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center 
Public Facilities District (“Wenatchee Events Center”), which applied a new method for 
determining what constitutes debt—the risk-of-loss principle—to conclude that the entire 
value of a CLA constitutes debt. This Essay urges the Court to revisit the opinion because the 
decision fails to offer clear guidance and relies on an unpersuasive distinction between debt 
and indebtedness to explain the holding. Additionally, this Essay argues that the risk-of-loss 
principle is not the correct standard for municipal debt because the framework is not 
supported by Washington precedent and the principle is a novel approach that disregards the 
origins  of  Washington’s  debt  provisions.   If   the  Court  decides  to  continue  treating  CLAs  as  
debt, this Essay suggests the Court should not follow Wenatchee Event Center’s  conclusion  
that the entire value of the CLA is debt and instead adopt the approach of the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles for governments: The amount of debt equals only that 
portion that is likely to become owed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before 2012, Washington municipalities commonly used contingent-
liability   agreements   (“CLA”   or   “CLAs”)1 to help other municipalities 
reduce borrowing costs by making it easier to secure affordable bond 
rates.2 Under these agreements, a municipality typically agreed to pay 
the   borrower’s   debt   or   provide   a   loan   only   if   the borrower—often 
another municipality—was unable to pay bondholders.3 After executing 
                                                     
1. Contingent  liabilities  are  “liabilities  or  obligations  which  become  the  financial  responsibility  of  
another   at   a   given   date   when   certain   conditions   are   not   met.”   ROY J. KOEGEN, WASHINGTON 
MUNICIPAL FINANCING DESKBOOK 522 (1993). CLAs are one method of creating contingent 
liabilities.  
2. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Treasurer in Support of Direct Review at 2, 10–
11, In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee  Reg’l  Events  Center  Pub.  Facilities  Dist.,  175  Wash.  
2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (No. 86552-3) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Direct Review]. The amount secured by CLAs is significant; these agreements back more than $271 
million in bonds. Id. at 10 (calculating the value of CLAs secured by public facilities district but not 
including other municipal corporations). 
3. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Treasurer at 1–2, In re Bond Issuance of Greater 
Wenatchee  Reg’l  Events  Center  Pub.  Facilities  Dist.,  175  Wash.  2d  788,  287  P.3d  567  (2012)  (No.  
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a  CLA,   the  borrower’s  debt  secured  by   the  agreement  was  not  counted  
towards the non-borrowing   municipality’s   constitutional   debt   limit  
because their obligation to pay or lend money was contingent on the 
borrower not paying.4 This practice was approved by Comfort v. City of 
Tacoma,5 a 1927 Washington State Supreme Court decision that 
established the contingent-liability doctrine.6 This doctrine, however, 
was called into question  by  the  Court’s  2012  plurality  decision  in   In re 
Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public 
Facilities District (“Wenatchee Events Center”).7 
In Wenatchee Events Center, the Court evaluated a proposed CLA 
between the City of Wenatchee  (the  “City”)  and  the  Greater  Wenatchee  
Regional  Event  Center  Public  Facilities  District  (the  “District”).8 Under 
the proposed agreement, the City would be obligated to make a loan to 
the District if the District lacked sufficient funds to meet its bond-
payment obligations.9 The lead opinion concluded that the potential 
obligation under the proposed agreement was debt under the Washington 
State Constitution article VIII.10 The plurality reached this conclusion 
by: (1) distinguishing   between   “debt”   and   “indebtedness”—the key 
terms used to restrict state and municipal debt respectively11—and 
(2) deducing the existence of the risk-of-loss principle.12 After 
recognizing the principle, the Court applied it to determine whether a 
contingent liability is a debt of a municipality.13 In doing so, the lead 
                                                     
86552-3) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae]. 
4. Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255–56, 252 P. 929, 931 (1927). 
5. Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931. 
6. See In re Bond  Issuance  of  Greater  Wenatchee  Reg’l Events Center Pub. Facilities Dist., 175 
Wash. 2d 788, 800, 287 P.3d 567, 573 (2012) [hereinafter Wenatchee Events Center] (plurality 
opinion) (discussing Comfort’s  “contingency  doctrine”). 
7. 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion). While five justices signed the 
opinion, one of the signatories concurred in the result only. Id. at 810, 287 P.3d at 578 (noting that 
Justice   Wiggins’s   lead   opinion   was   signed   by   Justices   C.   Johnson, J. Johnson, González, and 
Stephens, but that Justice Stephens concurred only in the result). Washington State courts treat such 
a decision as a plurality. See, e.g., Kailin v. Clallam Cnty. 152 Wash. App 974, 985, 220 P.3d 222, 
226–27 (2009) (stating there was no majority opinion when four justices signed onto the reasoning 
and a fifth concurred in the result only). 
8. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569. 
9. Id. at 793, 287 P.3d at 570. 
10. Id. at 791–92, 287 P.3d at 569. 
11. Id. at 806–07, 287 P.3d at 577. 
12. See id. at 798 n.9, 287 P.3d at 572 n.9. The principle means there is debt when taxpayers 
could be responsible for a payment, id. at 798–99, 287 P.3d at 573, and is discussed further infra 
Part I.C.2.a. 
13. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. 
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opinion rejected Comfort’s  contingent-liability doctrine14 but also noted 
that the opinion was not overruling Comfort—instead, the plurality 
distinguished the contingent liability in Wenatchee Events Center from 
the similar agreement in Comfort.15 Specifically, Wenatchee Events 
Center focused   on   how   the   City’s   CLA   secured   the   District’s   entire  
repayment obligation while Comfort’s   contingent   agreement   secured  
only  a  portion  of  the  primary  debtor’s  obligation.16 For the lead opinion, 
this meant Wenatchee Events Center presented debt because the 
agreement was properly construed as a guaranty while Comfort did not 
create debt because the underlying agreement could properly be called a 
contingent obligation.17 
The decision in Wenatchee Events Center creates two significant 
problems. First, the lead opinion fails to offer clear guidance on CLAs to 
lower courts or municipalities because: (1) as a plurality opinion, the 
decision has limited precedential value;18 and (2) the opinion appeared to 
both approve and reject the contingent-liability doctrine.19 This 
uncertainty about the treatment of CLAs will disrupt municipal 
borrowing by increasing borrowing costs, impeding cooperation between 
municipalities, and making it difficult to ascertain the value added by 
these agreements.20 Second,   the   opinion’s   treatment   of   contingent  
liabilities could disrupt municipal planning or existing projects by 
forcing municipalities to suddenly recognize new debt from pre-existing 
CLAs, which could push municipalities beyond their constitutional 
limits and prevent them from incurring new debt.21 
In response to these practical concerns about the effects of Wenatchee 
Events Center and   issues  with   the  opinion’s   analysis   (discussed   infra), 
                                                     
14. Id. at 800–01, 287 P.3d at 574. 
15. Id. at  802,  287  P.3d  at  574  (noting  that  “Comfort may well have been correctly decided on its 
facts”  and  explaining  how  Comfort is distinguishable from Wenatchee Events Center). 
16. Id.  
17. Id. 
18. In re Isadore,   151  Wash.   2d   294,   302,   88   P.3d   390,   394   (2004)   (noting   that   “[a] plurality 
opinion  has  limited  precedential  value  and  is  not  binding  on  the  courts”). 
19. Infra Part I.C.2.b. 
20. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 7.  
21. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Direct Review, supra note 2, at 10–11. While the lead 
opinion did not opine on whether its holding would have applied to preexisting CLAs because 
Wenatchee Events Center only concerned a proposed agreement, municipalities have nonetheless 
treated the opinion as having retroactive effect by recognizing preexisting CLAs as debt. See, e.g., 
KING CNTY., WASH., OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 27 (Nov. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.emma.msrb.org/EA485733-EA376808-EA773580.pdf; HOUS. AUTH. OF SNOHOMISH 
CNTY., OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 20 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP724576-
EP562183-EP963365.pdf.  
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this Essay: (1) asserts that the Court should revisit, correct, and clarify 
the treatment of contingent liabilities; and (2) proposes an alternative 
standard for when these liabilities should be recognized as debt. Part I 
explains  the  applicable  parts  of  Washington’s  constitutional  debt   limits  
and the lead opinion in Wenatchee Events Center. Part II argues that 
Wenatchee Events Center’s analysis and conclusion are problematic, and 
proposes a different standard based on the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITS BEFORE AND AFTER 
WENATCHEE EVENTS CENTER 
An examination of Wenatchee Events Center requires an 
understanding of Washington’s constitutional debt limits. Accordingly, 
this Essay begins with an examination of the Washington State 
Constitution article VIII, sections 1 and 6—specifically, those sections’ 
origins, text, and interpretation—before concluding with a summary of 
Wenatchee Events Center’s lead opinion. 
A. Constitutional Restrictions on Debt in Washington 
Before  turning  to  Washington’s  debt  limits,  this  Essay highlights the 
impetus for these limits and the background against which they were 
enacted. 
1. National Trends Influenced Washington’s  Debt  Limits 
Washington’s   constitution,   drafted   in   1889,   came   at   the   end   of   a  
century that saw two waves of constitutional reform aimed at limiting 
public debt.22 The first wave targeted state debt as a response to the 
Financial Panic of 1837 when states that had borrowed aggressively 
were unable to meet their obligations.23 These changes left municipal 
debt unchecked.24 The second wave, starting in the 1870s, targeted 
municipal debt as a response to rapid, unchecked increases in spending 
that left many municipalities near bankruptcy with little to show for their 
efforts.25 
                                                     
22. Reuven Mark Bisk, Note, State and Municipal Lease—Purchase Agreements: A 
Reassessment, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 525–26 (1984).  
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 525. 
25. See C. Dickerman Williams & Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., Municipal Improvement as Affected by 
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 177–78, 180 (1937).  
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While the first wave favored absolute limits on state debt, the second 
wave eschewed specific amounts in favor of linking municipal-debt 
limits to a floating value.26 These municipal provisions generally use 
similar language and structure: restricting debt to a set percentage of the 
assessed value of taxable property in the municipality.27 These 
constitutional sections were designed to prevent municipalities from 
indulging in extravagant or improvident purchases that they could not 
afford by shifting the cost to future generations.28 
Towards the end of the debt-limit   movement’s   second   wave,  
Washington held its constitutional convention.29 The delegates were 
aware of the recent additions of debt-limit provisions to various state 
constitutions30 and were guided by similar concerns: the dangers of 
unlimited debt and detrimental effect of unrestrained indebtedness on 
future prosperity.31 Specifically, the delegates wanted limits that would 
protect people from the type of bad decisions that led to government 
bankruptcies in the 1800s,32 guard taxpayer credit,33 and prevent the 
oppression that develops from potentially ruinous taxation.34 In pursuit 
of these goals, the delegates chose constitutional debt limitations 
because those at the convention believed: (1) political checks were 
                                                     
26. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525. 
27. C. Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly 
Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234, 241 (1958) (noting that nearly every state 
constitution limits municipal debt to a percentage of the value of taxable property); infra note 40 
(comparing debt-limit language between states). 
28. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 25, at 180. Although the restrictions were designed as rigid 
barriers,   the   limits  have  been  construed  more  liberally   to  avoid  crippling  municipalities’  ability   to  
function effectively. Dennis J. Heil, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: Debt Limitation, the 
Broad Special Fund Doctrine, and WPPSS 4 and 5, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 81, 86 (1983) 
(noting there has been a nation-wide trend of courts approving devices for evading local-debt limits 
in response to rigid debt-limit provisions). 
29. See HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 54 
(1916) (listing the 27 states that adopted limits between 1867 and 1907); THE JOURNAL OF THE 
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 WITH ANALYTICAL INDEX 1 (Beverly 
Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL] (indicating the convention began on July 4, 
1889); Bisk, supra note 22, at 525 (noting that municipal-debt   limits   “quickly   followed”   the  
Depression of 1873). 
30. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 44–45 (reprinting a letter presented to the delegates that 
highlighted  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  restricting  debt). 
31. Id. at 667; see also Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  257,  804  P.2d  
1241, 1246 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
32. Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 257–58, 804 P.2d at 1246. 
33.  Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 801, 666 P.2d 329, 344 
(1983) (Dore, J., concurring). 
34. Id. (quoting 56 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 599, at 651 (1971)).  
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insufficient35 and (2) a constitution without such limits would render 
municipal bonds worthless36—a belief likely driven by the history of 
municipal bankruptcies, caused by unchecked spending, that impaired 
bond repayment.37 
With goals that were similar to the other states that had already 
enacted limits, the convention delegates discussed proposals that 
mirrored versions passed in other states.38 Ultimately, the delegates 
enacted stringent constitutional restrictions on the ability of the state and 
municipalities to incur debt39 in line with provisions enacted earlier in 
other states.40 Like other jurisdictions, the delegates created provisions 
imposing   an   “impassable   barrier”41 designed   “for   the   protection   of  
minorities, for the protection of posterity, and to protect majorities 
against  their  own  improvidence.”42 
                                                     
35. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 796, 287 P.3d 567, 571 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
36. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 160 (2d ed. 
2013). 
37. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525 (explaining that constitutional debt limits developed in 
response to local government bankruptcies caused by fiscal imprudence). 
38. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE § 4.2, 171 (1992) (discussing how states often enacted absolute limits on 
state debt while linking municipal-debt limits to a percentage of assessed property value); JOURNAL, 
supra note 29, at 668–71, 675–79 (documenting that the delegates considered absolute limits on 
state debt and dynamic limits on municipal debt linked to a percentage of property values). 
39. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (amended 1952). 
40. See State ex rel. Troy   v.  Yelle,   36  Wash.   2d   192,   204,   217  P.2d   337,   343   (1950)   (“Many  
states  have  constitutional  provisions  generally  similar  to  [article  VIII]  of  our  constitution.”);;  Arthur  
S. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington Constitution, in 2011–2012 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 385, 
411 (noting   that   section   6   is   similar   to   a   provision   in   Illinois’   Constitution).   Compare WASH. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 6  (stating  that  no  municipality  “shall  for  any  purpose  become  indebted in any 
manner  to  an  amount  exceeding”  a  certain  percentage),  with IND. CONST. art. 13, § 1 (stating that no 
municipality  “shall  ever  become  indebted,   in  any  manner  or  for  any  purpose  to  an  amount,  in  the  
aggregate,   exceeding”   a   certain   percentage), and WIS. CONST. art XI, § 3(2) (stating that no 
municipality   “may   become   indebted   in   an   amount   that   exceeds”   a   certain   percentage).   The  
similarities are not surprising because the delegates were aware of the practices in other states. 
JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 44–45. 
41. State ex rel. Jones v. McGraw, 12 Wash. 541, 543, 41 P. 893, 894 (1895). It is questionable, 
however, how strict and impassable the barrier is when the Court has determined multiple funding 
mechanisms are not debt and permitted municipalities to exceed their debt limit for public 
emergencies. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 796–97, 287 P.3d 567, 571–72 
(2012) (plurality opinion) (noting the various principles and interpretations the Court has used to 
exclude obligations from implicating the debt limits); cf. Heil, supra note 28, at 86 (recognizing a 
national trend of courts approving methods for evading rigid limits). 
42. State ex rel. Potter v. King Cnty., 45 Wash. 519, 528, 88 P. 935, 938 (1907). 
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2. Washington’s  Constitutional  Limits  on  State  and  Municipal  Debt 
Motivated by concerns expressed throughout the two debt movements 
of   the   1800s,   the   delegates   at  Washington’s  Constitutional  Convention  
settled on two separate limits: one for municipalities and another for the 
state. 
Article VIII, section 6 permits municipalities to become indebted for 
a public purpose but limits the amount of debt they can incur.43 Under 
section 6: 
No county, city, town, school district, or other municipal 
corporation shall for any purpose become indebted in any 
manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of 
the taxable property in such county, city, town, school district, 
or other municipal corporation without the assent of three-fifths 
of the voters . . . .44 
This provision has remained substantively unchanged since the 
Constitution was ratified.45 
Relatedly, article VIII, section 1 limits state debt. The original 
provision restricted the state to $400,000 of debt.46 In 1972, section 1 
was amended to make the limit a floating number based upon a 
percentage of general revenues over a specific number of years.47 
Despite the significant change, the Court has concluded that the 
underlying purpose of section 1 remains the same.48 The state debt 
limitation was further amended in 1999 and in 2012; however, the 
function and structure remain generally the same as the 1972 version.49 
                                                     
43. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. 
44. Id. (emphasis added). Municipalities may also seek voter approval to incur debt up to five 
percent of the assessed value of property and can become indebted up to an additional five percent 
without voter approval for certain municipal-controlled utilities. Id. 
45. See Washington State Constitution, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/lawsandagencyrules/Pages/constitution.aspx (last visited April 11, 2015) 
(indicating there has only been one amendment to article VIII, section 6). The only changes to 
section 6 occurred on November 4, 1952, when voters approved slight grammatical changes and the 
addition of a clause noting that school districts, with voter assent, can become indebted above the 
debt limit. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (repealed 1952), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 6. See also EARL COE, SEC’Y OF STATE, A PAMPHLET 20 (1952) (voter pamphlet for the general 
election to be held on Tuesday, November 4, 1952). 
46. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972). 
47. A. LUDLOW KRAMER, SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET 50–51 (1972) (voter 
pamphlet for the general election to be held on Tuesday, November 7, 1972). 
48. Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  257,  804  P.2d  1241,  1246  (1991)  
(plurality opinion). 
49. The 1999 amendment allowed the state to guaranty voter-approved, general-obligation debt of 
the school district without having the guaranty count as state debt. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF 
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The current version provides: 
The aggregate debt contracted by the state, as calculated by the 
treasurer at the time debt is contracted, shall not exceed that 
amount for which payments of principal and interest in any 
fiscal year would require the state to expend more than the 
applicable percentage limit of the arithmetic mean of its general 
state revenues for the six immediately preceding fiscal 
years . . . .50 
There are three main differences between the state and municipal debt 
limitations. First, the provisions calculate the limit differently. The state 
limit is a percentage of general revenues over multiple years while the 
municipal limit is a percentage of the recently assessed value of taxable 
property.51 Second, each section has a different method for determining 
whether the limit has been reached. The amount of debt the state can 
incur is based on how much debt service must be paid annually 
(regardless  of  the  state’s  total  obligations);;  in  contrast,  the  municipality  
restriction focuses on the total amount of debt (without regard to annual 
payment obligations).52 Third, the state-debt provision precisely defines 
“debt,”  while  the  municipal  provision  does  not.53 
B. Triggering Article VIII Limits 
Because Wenatchee Events Center purported to change the article 
VIII analysis, a critical examination of the opinion requires an 
understanding of how the Court previously interpreted the debt limits—
in particular, what triggered the limits and how contingent liabilities and 
guaranties54 were treated. 
                                                     
WASHINGTON VOTERS PAMPHLET 8–9 (1999) (voter pamphlet for the general election to be held on 
Tuesday, November 2, 1999). The 2012 amendment changed the formula for calculating how much 
debt the state may incur. KING CNTY., OFFICIAL LOCAL VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 32–33 (2012) (voter 
pamphlet for the general and special election to be held on Tuesday, November 6, 2012). 
50. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b).  
51. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. 
52. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. 
53. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. 
54. The  words  “guarantee”  and  “guaranty”  are  interchangeable.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
773  (9th  ed.  2009);;  For  clarity,  this  Essay  uses  “guaranty”  (and  the  plural  “guaranties”)  throughout 
because it is favored in Wenatchee Events Center, see generally Wenatchee Events Center, 175 
Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion), and is the version more commonly used in 
financial contexts, BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 399 (3d ed. 
2011). 
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1. Before Wenatchee Events Center, Section 1 and Section 6 Were 
Triggered by the Same Types of Obligations 
Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court did not recognize a 
difference between the types of obligations that would trigger the limits 
established in section 1 and section 6.55 Both sections were interpreted 
synonymously56 despite different operative phrases—section 1 uses 
“[t]he aggregate debt contracted   by   the   state”   and   section   6   employs  
“indebted in   any   manner.”57 The   Court   indicated   that   “debt”   and  
“indebtedness”   were   interchangeable by (1) using municipal cases to 
define  “debt”;;58 (2) applying the same principles to both sections59 while 
interchangeably citing cases relating to each section;60 and (3) relying on 
municipal debt cases to explain how the state-debt limit is calculated.61 
Based on this shared understanding of the two provisions, the Court used 
the  term  “debt”  to  refer  to  an  obligation  that  implicates  the  article  VIII  
limit of a state or a municipality. 
The Court also defined what constituted debt: borrowed money that 
the state or municipality was required to pay with proceeds of general 
tax levies.62 In State ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v. 
                                                     
55. While the lead opinion in Wenatchee Events Center does not treat these two provisions 
identically, this Essay argues in Part II.B, infra, that treating the provisions differently is an error. 
56. See State ex rel. Winston  v.  Rogers,  21  Wash.  206,  208,  57  P.  801,  802  (1899)  (“Section  6  of  
the same article (8) of the constitution limits municipal indebtedness, and should receive the same 
construction  as  section  1  relative  to  state  indebtedness.”);;  UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161 
(explaining  section  6’s  limitation  by  stating  “[a]s  with  state  obligations,  debt  is  defined  as  borrowed  
money  payable  from  taxes”).   
57. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(b), 6 (emphasis added). 
58. E.g., State ex rel. Wittler v. Yelle, 65 Wash. 2d 660, 669, 399 P.2d 319, 324–25 (1965) 
(explaining the meaning of state debt by citing two municipal cases: Winston v. City of Spokane, 12 
Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895), and Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 252 P. 929 (1927)). 
59. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 661, 384 P.2d 
833, 841–42 (1963) (recognizing the applicability of the special-fund doctrine in the state-debt 
context); City of Spokane, 12 Wash. at 526, 41 P. at 889 (applying the special-fund doctrine in the 
municipal-debt context). 
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. McGraw, 13 Wash. 311, 318–19, 43 P. 176, 178 
(1895) (applying the special-fund doctrine to state debt and citing City of Spokane—a municipal-
debt case). While the Court sometimes declines to apply a case from another section, the Court has 
justified those decisions by distinguishing between the financial agreements rather than the sections 
addressed in the cases. See, e.g., Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 659–60, 384 P.2d at 841–42 (addressing 
section 1 and distinguishing Comfort and City of Spokane without relying on the fact that those 
cases addressed section 6). 
61. Rogers, 21 Wash. at 208–09, 57 P. at 802. 
62. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 154, 161. For example, the government incurs debt when 
bonds are issued that will be repaid from a tax on cigarettes because the government is 
(1) borrowing funds from the bond purchasers and (2) repaying those bonds from a generally 
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Martin63 the Court wrote that “a   debt   of   the   State   of  Washington”   is 
“[a]ny   obligation   which   must   in   law   be   paid   from   any   taxes levied 
generally.”64 This opinion was supplemented two years later in State ex 
rel. Wittler v. Yelle65 when  the  Court  stated  that  it  “has  many  times  said  
what   Article   8   means   by   the   word   ‘debt.’ . . . [I]t means borrowed 
money.”66 While section 1 was later amended to reflect this 
understanding,67 the definition continues to resonate for section 6 as 
well; Justice Utter—the late Washington State Supreme Court 
Justice68—and Professor Hugh Spitzer—a Washington State 
Constitution scholar and public-finance lawyer69—embrace this 
definition in their treatise on the Washington State Constitution.70 
2. Before Wenatchee Events Center, Guaranties Constituted Debt 
While Contingent Obligations Were Not Treated as Debt 
With this definition of debt providing a framework for article VIII 
analysis, the Court addressed guaranties and CLAs. A guaranty is a 
promise to answer for the debt of another if the debtor fails to make a 
payment.71 Such an agreement is a narrower form of a CLA, which is the 
promise  to  answer  for  another’s  obligation upon the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of a specific event.72 Although guaranties and CLAs are 
closely related, the Court developed conflicting case law about these 
types of agreements under article VIII. The Court concluded in State 
Capitol Commission v. State Board of Finance73 that a guaranty created 
debt even though the State was not primarily liable.74 Conversely, the 
                                                     
applicable tax—an excise tax on cigarette sales. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 662, 384 P.2d at 843–44. 
63. 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). 
64. Id. at 661, 384 P.2d at 843. 
65. 65 Wash. 2d 660, 399 P.2d 319 (1965). 
66. Id. at 668, 399 P.2d at 324. Wittler also reviewed previous cases and found that borrowed 
money was involved in every case where article VIII applied. Id. at 669–70, 399 P.2d at 324–25.  
67. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)  (defining  debt  as  “borrowed  money”),  with WASH. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972) (omitting definition). 
68. Justice Robert Utter Profile, GALLAGHER L. LIBR., https://lib.law.washington.edu/content/ 
memorial/justiceutter (last visited April 10, 2015).  
69. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Curriculum Vitae, http://www.law.washington.edu/directory/ 
CV/SpitzerHugh.pdf (last visited April 11, 2015).  
70. See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161. 
71. Wilson  Court  Ltd.  P’ship  v.  Tony  Maroni’s  Inc.,  134  Wash.  2d  692,  707,  952  P.2d  590,  598  
(1998). 
72. See KOEGEN, supra note 1, at 522. 
73. 74 Wash. 15, 132 P. 861 (1913). 
74. Id. at 26–27, 132 P. at 865. 
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Court held in Comfort and Kelly v. City of Sunnyside75 that a contingent 
obligation to pay was not debt because the government was not 
primarily liable and the likelihood of any liability was speculative.76 The 
conflict between these lines of cases was the central issue in Wenatchee 
Events Center. 
In State Capitol Commission, the Court established that a guaranty of 
bonds is debt because   the   state’s   general   credit   had   been   pledged   for  
repayment.77 The Court developed this doctrine while evaluating the 
state’s   guaranty   of   bonds   that   were   secured   by   the   capitol-building 
fund.78 The Court concluded that these bonds, because of the guaranty, 
were general obligations of the state and were article VIII debt in accord 
with  “the  spirit  and  the   letter”  of   the  Constitution.79 The Court reached 
this conclusion even after acknowledging that taxpayers likely would not 
be obligated to make any payments because the value of the land 
securing the bonds exceeded the amount of the bonds.80 The mere 
possibility that the state would have to use general revenues to pay for 
these bonds, however unlikely, was sufficient to establish that the 
guaranty of the obligation was article VIII debt.81 
In Comfort, the Court recognized the contingent-liability doctrine 
without discussing the apparent conflict with State Capitol 
Commission’s  treatment  of  guaranties.82 The contingent-liability doctrine 
provides that no article VIII debt is incurred when the government is not 
primarily liable but is obligated to pay if some event occurs that is 
outside the control of the party securing the debt.83 Thus, an agreement 
pledging   the   government   fisc   to   repayment   of   another’s   debt   is   not  
                                                     
75. 168 Wash. 95, 11 P.2d 230 (1932). 
76. See id. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231; Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255, 252 P. 929, 
931 (1927).  
77. See   State   Capitol   Comm’n, 74 Wash. at 26–27, 132 P. at 865. Wenatchee Events Center 
asserts that this conclusion was reaffirmed in State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 
Wash. 2d 645, 654–55, 384 P.2d 833, 839 (1963), 175 Wash. 2d 788, 801, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012) 
(plurality opinion), but Martin did not affirm State  Capitol  Comm’n and instead discussed the case 
while surveying earlier cases. See Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 654–56, 384 P.2d at 839–40. 
78. State  Capitol  Comm’n, 74 Wash. at 18, 132 P. at 862. 
79. Id. at 27, 132 P. at 865. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. See Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255, 252 P. 929, 931 (1927). This decision 
reflected the approaches taken in other states. See id. at 256–57, 252 P. at 931 (discussing how other 
jurisdictions treat contingent liabilities); 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 41.22 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2005) (collecting cases from different jurisdictions for the 
assertion that contingent liabilities do not create indebtedness). 
83. See Comfort, 142 Wash. at 255, 252 P. at 931.  
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article VIII debt when the obligation to make payments is not realized 
until the borrowing entity defaults.84 
In Comfort, the city of Tacoma had established a fund—replenished 
in certain circumstances by a special-tax levy—that would ensure local-
improvement bonds were paid.85 If the city paid a bond using the fund, 
the City would be subrogated to the rights of the bondholder.86 However, 
there were significant limitations on the fund and its use. First, the 
fund’s   value   could   not   exceed   five   percent   of   the   outstanding  
improvement bonds secured by the fund.87 Second, the City was 
obligated to pay into the fund and purchase bonds only if the regular 
assessments were insufficient.88 Third, bondholders had no recourse 
against  Tacoma’s  general  revenue—the bondholders could only sue for 
repayment from the local-improvement-bond assessment or the fund 
created by Tacoma.89 
In evaluating whether the agreement constituted debt, the Court 
focused on the last two limitations   and   concluded   that   Tacoma’s  
obligation  was   not   article  VIII   debt   because   it  was   “only   a   contingent  
liability  as  far  as  the  city  is  concerned,  and  in  no  sense  a  debt  proper.”90 
It was not a debt because the bondholders had no unconditional right to 
receive money from Tacoma:91 The city incurred an obligation only if 
the regular assessments were insufficient and the bondholders sought 
repayment from the guaranty fund created by the city.92 The Court 
explained: 
If A. is indebted to B., and C. promises that, if A. does not pay 
B., then he (C.) will, no one would contend that C. had an 
outstanding debt. He has but a contingent liability that may or 
may not ripen into a debt. If A. fails to pay, then, in that event, 
the contingent liability has ripened, and the debt is absolute as to 
C. But until that time arrives C. owes B. nothing. So in the 
present case, the city will have nothing to pay if the property 
holders meet their obligations and pay their assessments. If they 
fail to do so, then the city will pay into the fund to the extent 
                                                     
84. See id. at 255–56, 252 P. at 931. 
85. Id. at 254, 252 P. at 929–30. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 254–55, 252 P. at 930–31.  
88. Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931. 
89. Id. at 254–55, 252 P. at 930–31. 
90. Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931. 
91. See id.  
92. See id. 
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outlined in the statute.93 
Accordingly, the Court held a contingent liability is not debt because 
the obligation has not actually become a liability but merely gives rise to 
the potential that a liability may be incurred.94 
In 1932, Kelly reaffirmed Comfort but again the Court did not address 
the conflict with State Capitol Commission.95 In Kelly, the Court 
clarified the contingent-liability doctrine by responding to the 
appellant’s   argument   that   Austin v. City of Seattle96 controlled.97 The 
Court explained that Austin was distinguishable because the city was 
primarily liable in that case rather than contingently liable.98 Like 
Comfort, Kelly focused on whether the treasury was directly and 
immediately at risk rather than whether there might ultimately be such a 
risk.99 The decision in Kelly helped further delineate the doctrine by 
emphasizing that contingent liability is the opposite of primary 
liability.100 In sum, the Court used Comfort and Kelly to establish that a 
contingent liability—an obligation that may be incurred —is not article 
VIII debt.101 
Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court had two lines of cases 
dealing with the calculation of debt in situations where the government 
is not primarily liable: Comfort/Kelly and State Capitol Commission. In 
the first line—Comfort and Kelly—the Court held such obligations are 
not debt because they are merely contingent liabilities. The Court 
determined that the agreements were not debt by focusing on the fact 
that the municipality may not be required to make a payment. In the 
second line—State Capitol Commission—the Court concluded potential 
obligations are debt because they are a guaranty. The Court honed in on 
the fact that the treasury ultimately would be responsible for payment if 
the primary debtor was unable to pay. In sum, the Court had two lines of 
cases dealing with potential obligations—a conflict that posed the 
                                                     
93. Id. at 255–56, 252 P. at 931. 
94. See id. 
95. See Kelly v. City of Sunnyside, 168 Wash. 95, 96–97, 11 P.2d 230, 231 (1932). 
96. 2 Wash. 667, 27 P. 557 (1891).  
97. Kelly, 168 Wash. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231. 
98. Id. In Austin, the Court concluded a debt was created when a city charter provision made the 
city primarily liable for all improvement bonds—whereas in Kelly, the city only had contingent 
liability. Id.  
99. See Comfort, 142 Wash. at 255, 252 P. at 931 (focusing on whether the municipality was 
primarily liable instead of whether it might become liable in the future); Kelly, 168 Wash. at 96–97, 
11 P.2d at 231 (relying on Comfort). 
100. See Kelly, 168 Wash. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231. 
101. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161. 
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central issue in Wenatchee Events Center. 
C. Wenatchee Events Center Calls into Question the Continued 
Viability of the Contingent-Liability Doctrine by Recasting the 
Analysis Used to Determine Debt 
In Wenatchee Events Center, the lead opinion attempted to resolve the 
conflict between State Capitol Commission and Comfort to answer 
whether the proposed CLA between the City and the District constituted 
article VIII debt for the City.102 The plurality addressed the conflict by 
re-characterizing prior cases as establishing the risk-of-loss principle103 
and then using that principle to establish State Capitol Commission as 
the correct statement of the law.104 But at the same time, the opinion also 
appeared to reaffirm Comfort105 and decide that the CLA was debt 
because it was a guaranty rather than a contingent obligation like the 
agreement in Comfort.106 
1. The Superior Court Treated the CLA as Debt 
At the superior court, the issue in Wenatchee Events Center was 
whether the proposed CLA107 between the City and the District 
constituted article VIII debt.108 The City and the District negotiated the 
CLA to help the District secure affordable financing for bonds.109 Those 
bonds would pay off the short-term bond anticipation notes that financed 
the construction of the Regional Events Center.110 The CLA would have 
obligated the City to loan the District money only if the District lacked 
                                                     
102. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 799–801, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
103. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73. 
104. Id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. 
105. See id.  
106. See id. at 803–04, 287 P.3d at 575. 
107. Although the final agreement was called an interlocal agreement, Wenatchee City Council 
Res. No. 2011-52, at exhibit A (July 14, 2011) (enacted) [hereinafter CLA Terms], available at 
http://www.wenatcheewa.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5657, this is just a broad 
term for a contract between two or more public entities. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.080 (2014). The 
resolution approving the agreement, drafts of the agreement, and the Court were more specific—
each identified the type of contract at issue: a contingent-loan agreement—a form of a CLA. CLA 
Terms, supra, at 1; WENATCHEE CITY COUNCIL, COUNCIL PACKET (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.wenatcheewa.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5547; Wenatchee Events 
Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569.  
108. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569. 
109. See CLA Terms, supra note 107, at 1–2. 
110. See id. 
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sufficient funds to pay the principal and interest on the new bonds.111 
This  obligation  was  not  limited  to  the  City’s  debt  limit:  The City had an 
unconditional obligation to lend the District as much money as was 
required to service the bonds.112 But the District did not have to apply 
the loans to servicing the bonds; the City could direct that its loan be 
used only for operation costs of the Regional Events Center.113 
Furthermore, the City could fund these loans however it saw fit; the 
loans did not have to be funded by levying taxes or borrowing money.114 
The  CLA  also   limited   the  City’s   potential   liability   from  bondholder  
suits as well as insulating the City against the risk that the District would 
be unable to repay the loans because it was insolvent. The CLA provided 
that  “[a]ll  liabilities  incurred  by  the  District,  including  but  not  limited  to  
the [b]onds, are obligations solely of the District and shall not be 
liabilities  or  obligations  of  the  City.”115 Furthermore, bondholders would 
have no recourse against the City.116 The CLA included numerous 
provisions  to  ensure  the  City  was  repaid.  First,   the  District’s  obligation  
to repay the loans was absolute and unconditional—the District pledged 
its full faith, credit, and resources towards repayment.117 Second, if the 
District lacked sufficient debt capacity, then any loan constituted an 
equity payment for an interest in the Regional Events Center.118 Third, 
the City could force the District to call bonds for redemption, levy a tax, 
or put a proposition on the ballot to increase taxes.119 
On June 30, 2011, the Wenatchee City Council passed a resolution 
approving the CLA on the condition that the City obtain a judicial 
declaration that the City had authority to enter the agreement without 
voter assent.120 The City filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking a 
declaratory judgment on whether the CLA would cause the City to 
exceed its debt limit—effectively, the City asked whether the CLA 
constituted article VIII debt and, if so, to what extent.121 The Superior 
                                                     
111. Id. 
112. See id. at 2–3. 
113. Id. at 3. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 5. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 6–7. 
120. Id. (resolution attached to terms).  
121. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 794, 287 P.3d 567, 570 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Court concluded that the entire amount secured by the CLA would 
constitute debt under article VIII.122 Following an appeal, the Court took 
the case on direct review.123 
2. The Court Concluded the CLA Was Debt After Adopting a New 
Framework that Rejected the Contingent-Liability Doctrine 
The   lead   opinion   affirmed   the   trial   court’s   decision124 after re-
characterizing prior cases to establish that the risk-of-loss principle 
guides the analysis under article VIII and makes contingent liabilities 
debt under section 6.125 But after concluding that contingent liabilities 
are debt, the lead opinion stated that the obligation at the center of the 
case was debt based on the fact that the agreement was actually a 
guaranty.126 
a. The Lead Opinion Re-Characterized Prior Cases to Establish that 
the Risk-of-Loss Principle Determines When Debt Is Created 
The lead opinion used the risk-of-loss principle to guide the analysis 
of what constitutes debt. According to this principle, courts determine 
whether there is debt by focusing on who—the taxpayers or the 
creditors—would lose money if the primary debtor is unable to pay127 
without considering the likelihood of such an occurrence or the amount 
at risk.128 Specifically, there is article VIII debt when taxpayers could be 
required to make a payment on a debt obligation because the risk of loss 
is deemed to fall on taxpayers rather than creditors.129 The plurality 
justified applying this principle by concluding that the principle 
underlies many of the various analyses the Court has used when 
evaluating article VIII.130 In support of this conclusion, the lead opinion 
noted that Robert Amdursky and Clayton Gillette131 previously had 
                                                     
122. Id. at 794, 287 P.3d at 570. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 792, 287 P.3d at 569. 
125. See id. at 801, 287 P.3d at 574. 
126. See id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575. 
127. See id. at 797, 287 P.3d at 572.  
128. Id. at 798, 287 P.3d at 573.  
129. See id. at 797, 287 P.3d at 572.  
130. Id. The lead opinion, however, only addressed the principles explanatory power for three of 
the  Court’s  doctrines:  guaranties,  special  funds,  and  lease-purchase agreements. Id. at 797–98, 287 
P.3d at 572–73.  
131. This  Essay  will  refer   to  “Amdursky  and  Gillette”  as  “Gillette”  when  discussing  their  work  
because Gillette was the author responsible for the portions of their book that are referenced in this 
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characterized Washington cases in this manner in their book on 
municipal debt.132 
The plurality rationalized its use of the risk-of-loss principle by re-
characterizing earlier cases and concluding that the principle explained 
the   cases’   results.133 Because the Court had not explicitly or formally 
adopted this analysis in earlier cases,134 the  plurality  was  “forced to craft 
this test through inference.”135 The lead opinion developed this rule by 
focusing on the facts and conclusions of each case but without 
discussing the analysis in them.136 For example, the opinion highlighted 
how the facts and opposite conclusions in State ex rel. Winston v. City of 
Spokane137 and Martin—relatively similar cases involving construction 
bonds that reached different results on whether the obligations 
constituted debt—illustrate the point that the risk-of-loss principle 
explains earlier cases.138 The plurality also contended the Court had 
begun explicitly relying on this principle.139 The opinion focused on 
Department of Ecology’s  plurality  opinion,  which  held  there  was  no  debt  
                                                     
Essay. E-mail from Clayton P. Gillette, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, to 
Hugh Spitzer, Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law (May 19, 2013, 14:31 
EST) (on file with author). Clayton Gillette is a Professor of Law at New York University School of 
Law who focuses on, among other things, local-government law. Clayton Gillette, N.Y.U., 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=19945. 
132. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572 (discussing AMDURSKY & 
GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 164–70).  Gillette’s  work is discussed further in Part II.C.1.c.  
133. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73. 
134. See id. at 819, 287 P.3d at 582 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra 
note 38, § 4.1.2, at 169  (stating  that  “the  mechanisms  devised  to  avoid  debt  limits  have  not  readily  
been  analyzed  by  reference  to  the  standard  of  ultimate  exposure  of  the  public  treasury”). 
135. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 819, 287 P.3d at 582 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting). 
Even the plurality appears to concede the principle has not been definitively established as the law. 
See id. at 798 n.9, 287 P.3d at 572 n.9 (plurality opinion) (asserting it is important to state the 
principle directly because there is a pattern of courts relying on the principle). 
136. See id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73. 
137. 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895). 
138. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. The lead opinion 
asserted there was article VIII debt in Martin because if the state was unable to repay the bonds then 
the state would raise the excise tax, therefore, putting the risk of a shortfall on the taxpayers. Id. at 
797, 287 P.3d at 572. In contrast, Wenatchee Events Center highlighted that the bonds in City of 
Spokane were  not  debt  because  the  bonds  were  payable  only  from  the  project’s  revenue—thus, the 
taxpayers bore no risk. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. But this reframing of cases is problematic; 
Martin, in particular, did not address who bore the risk of loss and instead relied on reaffirming the 
earlier principle that debt is an obligation payable from taxes. See generally State ex rel. Wash. 
State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). 
139. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572. The lead opinion omitted 
that Department of Ecology was a plurality—a majority agreed in the result but only three justices 
signed the opinion that Wenatchee Events Center quotes for the risk-of-loss principle. See generally 
Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  804  P.2d  1241  (1991)  (plurality  opinion). 
Hansen_Revisiting Contingent Liabilities_Copy Edit Changes Made.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/6/2015  4:46 PM 
122 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:105 
 
because “[t]he ultimate  risk  of  loss  is  not  on  the  State’s  future  taxpayers.  
Instead, the risk of loss is on the [investors], who will have entered into 
the transaction with full knowledge that they alone bear that risk.”140 
Having re-characterized  the  Court’s  previous  cases  to  establish the risk-
of-loss principle, the plurality in Wenatchee Events Center turned to the 
contingency and guaranty cases. 
b. The Lead Opinion Applied the Risk-of-Loss Principle to Resolve 
the Conflict Between the Guaranty and Contingent Liability Cases 
Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   addressed   the   conflict  
between the contingent-liability cases and the guaranty case—ultimately 
concluding that State Capitol Commission’s   treatment   of   guaranties   as  
debt is the correct statement of law.141 The plurality discussed three 
types of contingent liabilities: (1) pay-as-you-go agreement—the 
obligation to pay depends on receiving goods; (2) limited-contingent 
liability—the potential obligation is less than the entire debt; and 
(3) unlimited-contingent liability—the potential obligation is equal to the 
entire debt.142 The lead opinion concluded that a pay-as-you-go 
arrangement is not debt and then turned to the remaining types of 
contingent liabilities.143 
The lead opinion drew a distinction between limited- and unlimited-
contingent liabilities by suggesting that Comfort correctly stated the law 
but  that  the  case’s  dicta  was  too  broad.144 Specifically, the opinion stated 
that Comfort may have correctly held that limited-contingent obligations 
are not debt but reached too far by stating that unlimited-contingent 
obligations—which Wenatchee Events Center’s  plurality  deems  absolute  
guaranties—are not debt.145 This latter conclusion in Comfort the 
plurality deemed dicta and directly contradicted by State Capitol 
Commission’s  treatment of guaranties.146 
                                                     
140. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572–73 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 254–55, 804 P.2d at 1245).  
141. See id. at 799, 801–02, 287 P.3d at 573–74. 
142. See id. at 799–801, 287 P.3d at 573–74. 
143. Id. at 799–800, 287 P.3d at 573. 
144. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. 
145. See id. at 802, 287 P.3d at 574.  
146. Id. at 800–01, 287 P.3d at 573–74. It is debatable whether this portion of Comfort is dicta 
because  the  language  appears  directly  related  and  necessary  to  resolving  the  case’s  central  issue.  Id. 
at  816,  287  P.3d  at  581  (Fairhurst,  J.  dissenting).  Furthermore,  the  plurality’s  assertion that Comfort 
discussed two types of contingent liabilities—one in holding and one in dicta—is questionable 
because Comfort focused on whether the obligation was currently owed or whether it was 
conditioned on some future event—there was no indication that the limited size of the obligation 
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The plurality resolved this conflict by applying the risk-of-loss 
principle.147 The lead opinion explained that State Capitol Commission 
was correct and Comfort’s  dicta  was   incorrect  because   the   risk  of   loss  
for a contingent liability falls on the municipality: “Even   if   the  
municipality’s   liability  is  contingent  upon  the  failure  of  payment  by  an  
intervening agency such as the District, such a contingent liability is 
subject to the debt limit if the ultimate risk of loss falls upon the 
municipality.”148 Although the lead opinion asserted its holding was 
limited to Comfort’s   purported   dicta,   the   analysis   speaks   broadly   of  
contingent   liabilities   and   the   holding’s   justification—whether the 
taxpayer bears risk—is equally applicable to both limited- and 
unlimited-contingent liabilities.149 Thus, the lead opinion nominally 
treats only unlimited-contingent liabilities as debt but appears in practice 
to be overruling all of Comfort’s   contingent-liability doctrine and 
treating all contingent obligations as debt. 
c. The Lead Opinion Held that the Entire Value of the CLA Was 
Debt  Because  the  Agreement  was  a  Guaranty  of  the  District’s  
Bonds 
Despite focusing on contingent liabilities for much of the opinion, the 
lead opinion pivoted to conclude that the CLA was article VIII debt 
because the CLA was a guaranty.150 The plurality explained the 
substance of the agreement had the City acting as a traditional guarantor 
by pledging to provide credit security to make the bonds more 
marketable.151 Accordingly, the lead opinion treated the CLA as debt 
because the CLA mirrored the situation in State Capitol Commission: a 
public entity obligating itself to pay if the primarily liable party was 
unable to make payments.152 
In  sum,  Washington’s  constitutional-debt limits were at the center of 
                                                     
was a factor. See Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255–258, 252 P. 929, 931–32 (1927); 
see also State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 659–60, 384 P.2d 833, 
841 (1963) (explaining that the reason for Comfort’s  holding  was  that  the  obligations  were  not  the  
city’s  debt). 
147. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. Reading the lead opinion as applying to all of Comfort is 
further   justified   based   on   the   lead   opinion’s   unpersuasive   dissection   of Comfort into holding 
(limited-contingent liabilities) and dicta (unlimited-contingent liabilities). See supra note 146. 
150. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 803, 287 P.3d at 575. 
151. Id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575. 
152. See id. 
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Wenatchee Events Center. The Court was asked to reconcile existing 
case law on guaranties and contingent liabilities. The lead opinion 
resolved this conflict by developing an overarching framework for debt 
cases—the risk-of-loss principle—and applying that standard to reject 
only part of the contingent-liability   doctrine.  But   the  opinion’s   precise  
holding is unclear because the analysis seems to strike down the entire 
contingent-liability doctrine while also discarding any conclusions about 
the doctrine in favor of treating the agreement as a guaranty. Thus, 
Wenatchee Events Center leaves significant questions about the fate and 
scope of the contingent-liability doctrine. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT WENATCHEE EVENTS 
CENTER 
This Essay argues the Court should act promptly to address the 
unsettled state of the law following Wenatchee Events Center because 
the lead opinion fails to offer clear guidance, has a broader than intended 
scope, and presents an incorrect framework—the risk-of-loss principle—
for evaluating debt. Because Washington law does not support this 
principle, this Essay proposes the Court not follow Wenatchee Events 
Center’s   approach   that   treats   all   contingent   liabilities   as   debt and 
suggests treating as debt only those portions of contingent liabilities that 
appear likely to require payment. 
A. Wenatchee Events Center Does Not Offer Clear Guidance to 
Municipalities or Future Courts 
The   lead   opinion’s   failure   to   garner   a   majority   and its unclear 
treatment of contingent liabilities will make it difficult for municipalities 
to assess their debt and for future courts to evaluate debt cases. As an 
initial matter, the absence of a majority opinion minimizes the lead 
opinion’s   usefulness.  Because Wenatchee Events Center is a plurality, 
the opinion “has   limited   precedential   value   and   is   not   binding   on   the  
courts”;;153 thus, it is unclear whether the risk-of-loss principle will be 
applied in future cases and how courts will view the lead opinion’s  
treatment of contingent liabilities. 
Moreover,   the   lead   opinion’s   inconsistent   treatment   of   contingent  
liabilities also leaves courts and municipalities without clear guidance. 
While Wenatchee Events Center appeared to reject the contingent-
liability doctrine, the lead opinion obfuscated this message in two ways. 
                                                     
153. In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004). 
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First, the opinion suggested Comfort was correctly decided154 even 
though the risk-of-loss principle would seem to require overruling the 
case.155 Specifically, the lead opinion indicated that Comfort correctly 
held that limited-contingent obligations are not debt but did not reconcile 
that conclusion with the fact that a municipality entering such an 
agreement still bears some risk.156 Second, the opinion resolved the case 
by holding the CLA was debt because it was a guaranty rather than a 
contingent liability.157 
In sum, there is no binding precedent and the existing precedent is far 
from clear on how article VIII should be (or will be) treated in the 
future. 
B. The Lead Opinion Unpersuasively Attempted to Limit Wenatchee 
Events Center’s  Scope  by  Distinguishing  Between  Debt  and  
Indebtedness 
The   plurality’s   attempt   to   confine   the   effect   of   the   opinion   to   only  
municipal government debt by distinguishing between debt and 
indebtedness is unpersuasive.158 The basis for this position is not only at 
odds   with   the   Court’s   precedent   but   also   lacks   support   in   both   the  
Constitution’s   text   and   principles   of   constitutional   interpretation.  As   a  
result, Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   has   a  more   expansive  
scope than intended; the opinion puts both municipal and state financing 
schemes at risk—or at least significantly affects the market and costs for 
their bonds while uncertainty lingers about the plurality opinion.159 
The lead opinion justified its holding in part by explaining that 
section   6’s   language   limiting   the   ability   of   a   municipality   to   become  
indebted   in   any  manner   is   broader   than   section   1’s   limitation   on   state  
debt.160 But no authority was cited for this proposition nor was the 
conclusion justified with analysis.161 Basing such an important 
distinction on an unsupported assertion means that future courts and 
                                                     
154. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 802, 287 P.3d at 574. 
155. See id. at 801, 287 P.3d at 574 (explaining that a contingent liability is debt whenever 
taxpayers could ultimately be required to make a payment). 
156. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. The lead opinion does not explain why or how Comfort’s  
limited-contingent liability renders that agreement not debt or how courts in the future should 
determine what percentage is acceptable in a CLA before it becomes debt. 
157. Id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575. 
158. See id. at 807, 287 P.3d at 577 (stating that section 6 is broader than section 1). 
159. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 7. 
160. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 807, 287 P.3d at 577. 
161. See id. 
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policy makers will have to hypothesize as to the reasoning. Accordingly, 
this Essay presents, discusses, and ultimately rejects two potential 
justifications—based on the text of each provision—that might support 
the distinction. The Essay then turns to traditional principles of 
constitutional interpretation to bolster the conclusion that there is no 
difference  between  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”—which is the position the 
Court embraced prior to Wenatchee Events Center.162 Accordingly, the 
holding in Wenatchee Events Center is applicable to both state and 
municipal  financing  despite  the  lead  opinion’s  attempt  at  minimizing  the  
opinion’s  scope. 
1. “Debt”  is  Not  a  Term  of  Art  that  Is Narrower than 
“Indebtedness” 
The   plurality   could   be   asserting   that   “debt”   is   a   term   of   art   while  
“indebted  in  any  manner”  is  not.163 This has some facial appeal because 
article VIII, section 1(d) has a relatively detailed definition  of  “debt.”164 
If   “debt”   is   a   term   of   art,   then   the   corresponding   failure   to   define  
“indebtedness”  could  indicate  that  the  provisions  are  addressing  different  
types of obligations.165 To   understand   the   meaning   of   section   1’s  
definition   of   “debt,”   it   is helpful to look at the origins of the 
definition.166 The drafters of the 1972 amendment defining debt merely 
enshrined the definition established in previous cases.167 These cases and 
the  Court’s  other  opinions  addressing  debt  limitations  did  not  distinguish 
between debt and indebtedness; the Court often mixed and matched 
cases dealing with either section while applying the same analytical 
frameworks.168 Up until Wenatchee Events Center, no distinction was 
                                                     
162. Supra Part I.B.1. 
163. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 807, 287 P.3d at 577 (distinguishing section 
1 from section 6 on the basis that the language in section 6 is broader). 
164. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
165. Cf. State v. Kintz, 169 Wash. 2d 537, 549–50, 238 P.3d 470, 477 (2010) (explaining the 
importance attached to omissions when doing statutory interpretation). 
166. See Wash.  Water  Jet  Workers  Ass’n  v.  Yarbrough,  151  Wash.  2d  470,  477,  90  P.3d  42,  46  
(2004) (noting that the Court may examine the historical context of a constitutional provision for 
guidance). 
167. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)  (defining  debt  as  “borrowed  money”  that  must  be  
“repaid . . . from  general  state  revenues”),  with State ex rel. Wittler v. Yelle, 65 Wash. 2d 660, 668, 
399   P.2d   319,   324   (1965)   (noting   that   the   Court   has   repeatedly   said   debt   means   “borrowed  
money”),  State  ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 661, 384 P.2d 833, 843 
(1963)  (noting  “[a]ny  obligation which must in law be paid from any taxes levied generally is . . . a 
debt  of  the  state”),  and State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 36 Wash. 2d 192, 194, 217 P.2d 337, 338 (1950) 
(defining debt as borrowed money). 
168. Supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
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drawn   between   the   meaning   of   “debt”   and   “indebtedness.”169 
Accordingly,  the  argument  that  “debt”  in  section  1  is  a  term  of  art  does  
not  justify  a  broader  treatment  of  “indebtedness”  in  section  6. 
2. Section 6 Is Not More Inclusive than Section 1 
Alternatively,  the  plurality  could  be  arguing  that  section  6’s  inclusion 
of  “in  any  manner”  means   the  section   is  broader   than  section  1  (which  
just   refers   to   “debt”).   This   is   problematic   because   section   6   alternates  
between   “indebtedness”   and   “indebted   in   any   manner”   when   defining  
the applicable limitations.170 Therefore,   reaching   the   plurality’s  
conclusion  that  section  6  is  broader  than  section  1(d)  on  the  basis  of  “in  
any  manner”  would   also   require   recognizing   two   types   of   debt  within  
section 6—one   for   “indebtedness”   and   one   for   “indebted   in   any  
manner.”   Such   an   interpretation cannot be supported because (1) this 
distinction has not been recognized in previous cases, (2) Wenatchee 
Events Center made no reference to such a fundamental shift,171 and 
(3) this interpretation is not supported by the discussions at the 
Constitutional Convention that evince the purpose behind article VIII.172 
3. Principles of Constitutional Construction Support an Identical 
Interpretation  of  “Debt”  and  “Indebtedness” 
Having presented and rejected two possible justifications for the lead 
opinion’s   unsupported distinction between debt and indebtedness, the 
plurality’s   conclusion   is   also   not   supported   by   Washington   State  
principles of constitutional construction. Under these principles, the 
Court looks to the common, ordinary meaning of the words173 but may 
also consider historical context.174 If the words are unambiguous and the 
ordinary meaning leads to a reasonable conclusion, the terms are read 
                                                     
169. See supra Part I.B.2.  
170. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII,   §  6   (prohibiting  a  municipality   from  being   “indebted   in  any  
manner”  beyond  one  and  a  half  percent  without  assent  but  then  limiting  “indebtedness”  with  voter  
assent to five percent). 
171. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 807, 287 P.3d 567, 577 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
172. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 675–79  (presenting  a  record  of  the  delegates’  debates  about  
the debt limits without any indication that the delegates considered, let alone implemented, different 
methods of calculating municipal limits depending on whether the debt was incurred with or 
without voter assent). 
173. State ex rel. Albright v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 393 P.2d 231, 233 (1964). 
174. Wash.  Water   Jet  Workers   Ass’n   v.   Yarbrough,   151  Wash.   2d   470,   477,   90   P.3d   42,   46  
(2004).  
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according to this meaning rather than resorting to a forced construction 
to limit or extend the function.175 
Turning  first  to  the  ordinary  meanings  of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness,”  
there   is   no   basis   for   distinguishing   between   the   terms.   Black’s   Law  
Dictionary   treats   them   as   synonyms   by   defining   “indebtedness”   as  
“[s]omething  owed;;  a  debt.”176 Bryan Garner further explained that the 
terms are functional equivalents: “[Indebtedness] is frequently used 
where the simpler word debt would be preferable”  and  “indebtedness is 
a NEEDLESS VARIANT of debt.”177 Interpreting  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”  
as distinct terms would require a forced construction to create a 
difference where none exists. 
Second, the historical context offers no support for distinct 
interpretations  of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness.”  The  reasons  for  restricting  
state and municipal debt were identical.178 There is no indication in the 
convention record that the delegates intended section 1 and section 6 to 
restrict different types of obligations.179 
In sum, Wenatchee Events Center could have a broader than intended 
effect  because  the  lead  opinion’s  treatment of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”  
as distinct concepts is an unsupported conclusion that fails to narrow the 
holding. Thus, the lead opinion could have a significant effect on both 
municipalities and the state by altering their current debt levels, 
changing available financing mechanisms, and increasing costs.180 
Accordingly, the Court should revisit and clarify Wenatchee Events 
Center’s  discussion  of  debt. 
                                                     
175. O’Connell  v.  Slavin,  75  Wash.  2d  554,  558,  452  P.2d  943,  946  (1969). 
176. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). This definition is 
synonymous   with   the   definition   of   debt:   “liability   on   a   claim;;   a   specific   sum   of   money   due   by  
agreement  or  otherwise.”  Id. at 462. Even the lead opinion used the terms interchangeably earlier in 
the opinion. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791–92,   287   P.3d   at   569   (“Total  
municipal debt incurred   without   a   public   vote   is   limited”   and   “[o]ur   state   constitution   limits  
municipal indebtedness”  (emphasis  added)). 
177. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 436 (3d ed. 2009) 
(emphasis in original). Washington  courts  have  looked  to  Garner’s  work  to  help  clarify  definition  
and grammar issues in the past. E.g.,  Flight  Options,  LLC  v.  State  Dep’t  of  Revenue,  172  Wash.  2d.  
487, 502, 259 P.3d 234, 242 (2011) (citing BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL 
USAGE 811  (2d  ed.  1995),  for  the  proposition  that  “situate”  and  “situated”  are  synonyms);;  Black  v.  
Nat’l   Merit   Ins.   Co.,   154   Wash.   App.   674,   688,   226   P.3d   175,   182   (2010)   (citing   BRYAN A. 
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 453–54 (1st ed. 1998), for the proposition 
that  “or”  is  not  always  used  to  indicate  an  alternative).   
178. See supra Part I.A.1. 
179. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 667–84. 
180. See supra notes 20–21. 
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C. Wenatchee Events Center’s  Risk-of-Loss Principle Is Not the 
Correct Framework for Examining Public Debt in Washington 
The Court should not embrace the risk-of-loss principle in subsequent 
opinions. First, the framework is not supported in Washington case law. 
Second, the framework is not used by other jurisdictions, which is an 
important consideration because the Court has recognized that article 
VIII is situated firmly within a nationwide tradition and has drawn from 
other jurisdictions to resolve public-debt questions. 
1. Washington Law Does Not Support the Risk-of-Loss Principle 
The risk-of-loss principle is not supported  by  Washington’s  case  law  
on debt limits. This Essay highlights the lack of support by examining 
three  problems  with   the   lead  opinion’s   attempt   to   justify   the  principle.  
First, the plurality re-characterized prior precedent without regard for the 
analysis applied in those cases. Second, the plurality ignored 
inconsistent cases. Third, the plurality relied on an academic piece that 
recognized that the risk-of-loss principle is not a talisman for all of 
Washington’s   debt   cases   and   supported   the   principle’s   limited  
explanatory powers with problematic analysis. 
a. The  Lead  Opinion’s  Re-Characterization of Prior Cases Does Not 
Support the Conclusion that Risk of Loss Applies to Article VIII 
The   lead   opinion’s   establishment   of   the   risk-of-loss principle by re-
characterizing prior cases is problematic because the opinion conflates 
correlation   with   causation,   ignores   the   Court’s   various   approaches   to  
debt  limits,  and  fails  to  address  the  principle’s  absence  in  prior  case  law. 
Wenatchee Events Center conflates correlation with causation by 
ignoring the underlying analysis in the cases that are re-characterized to 
establish the risk-of-loss principle.181 The plurality establishes the 
principle by going through prior decisions and concluding that they are 
consistent with the risk-of-loss principle.182 But the opinion never 
discusses whether the decisions were actually decided on that principle 
nor does the plurality address the underlying analysis used in those 
cases.183 The plurality merely shows a correlation—the result in some of 
the   Court’s   earlier   decisions   may   be   consistent   with   the   risk-of-loss 
                                                     
181. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. For a discussion of 
how the lead opinion re-characterized prior cases see supra Part I.C.2.a. 
182. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572.  
183. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73. 
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principle—but never demonstrates that the Court used that principle to 
reach the result, let alone consistently approached cases using that 
framework.184 The plurality does not show causation because they 
cannot show causation: The Court has not previously analyzed debt 
cases using the risk-of-loss principle.185 Accordingly, the plurality does 
not demonstrate that the risk-of-loss principle is the basis for the results 
in previous cases, which undermines their reason for using the principle 
to address the Comfort-State Capitol Commission split and ultimately 
the CLA in Wenatchee Events Center. 
Moreover, the re-characterization of prior cases to establish a single 
principle is problematic   because   that   approach   disregards   the   Court’s  
history of employing various frameworks to guide the debt analysis. 
Like other jurisdictions, the Court resisted developing a general standard 
for determining whether obligations implicate the debt limits and instead 
relied on a diverse range of exceptions and principles.186 The lack of a 
unifying framework becomes more evident by looking at some of the 
Court’s   debt   cases   where   the   Court   fluctuated   between   relying  
extensively on the analysis conducted in other states187 and at other times 
looking only to local opinions.188 The variety of approaches the Court 
has   embraced   undermine   the   lead   opinion’s   attempt   to   re-characterize 
prior opinions in order to recognize one guiding principle. 
Finally, the re-characterization of Washington case law does not 
support the risk-of-loss   principle   because   the   lead   opinion’s   analysis  
glosses over the fact that the Court had never expressly embraced the 
principle in the debt-limit context.189 Despite over a century of case law 
                                                     
184. See id. 
185. Supra note 134. 
186. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. For a sampling of the different 
approaches, see Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm., 116 Wash. 2d 246, 254–55, 804 P.2d 1241, 
1245 (1991) (plurality opinion) (lease-purchase agreements), State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 36 Wash. 2d 
192, 195, 217 P.2d 337, 337 (1950) (warrant obligations for current year expenses), and Winston v. 
City of Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 526–27, 41 P. 888, 888 (1895) (special-fund doctrine). 
187. See, e.g., Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 256–57, 256 n.9, 804 P.2d at 1246, 1246 n.9 
(determining   that   Oregon’s   case   law  was   persuasive   and   citing   other   states’   opinions);;   Troy, 36 
Wash. 2d at 204–07, 217 P.2d at 343–45  (looking  to  Oklahoma’s  constitution  and  case  law). 
188. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 652–61, 384 
P.2d 833, 838–42 (1963) (clarifying the special-fund doctrine). 
189. Before Wenatchee Events Center,   the   Court’s   article   VIII   cases   applied   the   risk-of-loss 
framework   in   a  majority   opinion   only  when   evaluating   section   5’s   prohibition   on the lending of 
state credit to private parties. See Wash.  State  Hous.  Fin.  Comm’n  v.  O’Brien,  100  Wash.  2d  491,  
494–95, 671 P.2d 247, 249–50 (1983). However, the Court abandoned this framework following 
Professor Hugh   Spitzer’s An Analytical View of Recent “Lending of Credit” Decisions in 
Washington State, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 195 (1985). Wash. Higher Educ. Facilities Auth. v. 
Gardner, 103 Wash. 2d 838, 846–47, 699 P.2d 1240, 1244–45 (1985) (declining to use the risk-of-
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interpreting   section   1   and   section   6,   the   term   “risk   of   loss”   has   never  
appeared in a majority opinion addressing these issues. Before 
Wenatchee Events Center, the term was only used in the debt-limit 
context in Department of Ecology’s   plurality   opinion.190 If the risk-of-
loss   principle   guided   each   of   the   Court’s   debt   opinions,   one   would  
expect the term to have appeared: (1) before 1991, (2) within more than 
one opinion, or at least (3) inside a majority opinion. These absences 
reinforce the notion that the Court has not consistently relied on the risk-
of-loss principle when determining how to evaluate article VIII. 
Nonetheless, the plurality seizes on the language in Department of 
Ecology as evidence that that Court relied on the principle before 
Wenatchee Events Center.   The   lead   opinion   explained   that   in   “recent  
cases”  the  Court  has  “begun  explicitly  relying  on  the  risk  of  loss  concept  
as  a  basis  for  our  decisions”  and  presents  Department of Ecology as an 
example of this trend.191 The plurality is wrong for three reasons. First, 
there is no trend. Department of Ecology is not an example of recent 
cases relying explicitly on the risk-of-loss principle in the debt context—
it is the only case. Second, the Court did not embrace the principle in 
Department of Ecology despite the opportunity to do so. A majority of 
the Court declined to sign onto the opinion using the risk-of-loss 
language.192 Third, the scope of Department of Ecology is a matter of 
enough debate that the State Finance Committee has recommended a 
very narrow  reading  that  limits  reliance  on  the  case’s  holding  to  closely  
related facts.193 The State Finance Committee, after reviewing the 
“vigorous  dissent”  and  the  concurrence’s  emphasis  that  long-term leases 
should not be used as subterfuge, recommended that financing contracts 
only be used in fact patterns very similar to Department of Ecology in 
order to avoid having the agreements treated as debt.194 This guidance 
reflects a concern that Department of Ecology is not the fundamental 
shift for which the plurality cites the case. 
                                                     
loss approach and quoting Professor   Spitzer’s   Article). Moreover, lending credit and defining 
“debt”  are  distinct  concepts,  which  the  plurality  acknowledged  by  not  citing  O’Brien. See generally 
Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567. 
190. See   Dep’t   of   Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 254–55, 804 P.2d at 1245 (using the principle 
without citation to any other cases). 
191. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572. 
192. See  Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 259, 804 P.2d at 1247 (noting that only three justices 
signed the lead opinion); In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004) (explaining 
that a plurality is not binding on future courts). 
193. See generally WASH. STATE FIN. COMM., GUIDELINES FOR USE OF FINANCING CONTRACTS 
(2011), available at http://www.tre.wa.gov/documents/sfc_GuidlinesUseFinancingContracts.pdf. 
194. See id. at 1–2. 
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b. The Risk-of-Loss Principle Does Not Explain Washington Cases 
on Debt 
The analysis used to justify the risk-of-loss principle does not (and 
cannot) explain the diverse range of precedent on what is article VIII 
debt.195 Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court accepted the 
contingent-liability doctrine—a framework that is incompatible with the 
risk-of-loss principle.196 The lead opinion carefully avoids this issue by 
asserting the risk-of-loss principle through a limited survey of 
Washington cases; the plurality looks at cases that support their position 
and ignores cases like Kelly and Comfort that do not fit the 
framework.197 The plurality addresses these unsupportive cases only 
after establishing the framework they contend explains Washington law: 
the risk-of-loss principle.198 It   is   easier   to   “find”   principles   when   the  
search looks for authority that supports the idea and sets aside 
contradictory materials. 
c. The Lone Academic Piece Embracing the Risk-of-Loss Principle 
for Washington Cases Offers a Tentative and Incomplete Analysis 
Academics have not embraced the idea that the risk-of-loss principle 
explains  Washington’s  public  debt  cases.  The  idea  has  been  presented  in  
only   one   place:   Gillette’s   Municipal   Debt   Finance   Law:   Theory   and  
Practice.199 Despite   academia   not   embracing   Gillette’s   conclusion,   the  
plurality   relies   in   part   on   Gillette’s   analysis   as   part   of   the   basis   for  
establishing the risk-of-loss principle.200 This reliance is problematic for 
two reasons: (1) Gillette is unwilling to assert that risk of loss fully 
explains  Washington  debt  cases,  and  (2)  Gillette’s  analysis  is  incomplete  
                                                     
195. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. Even the plurality agrees that 
the risk-of-loss framework only explains some of the cases. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 
Wash.   2d   at   798,   287   P.3d   at   572   (“Nearly every case . . . is   consistent   with   this   ‘risk   of   loss’  
principle”  (emphasis  added)).   
196. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574. 
197. See id. at 797–99, 287 P.3d at 572–73 (establishing the risk-of-loss principle by looking to 
City of Spokane, Martin, and Department of Ecology without discussing Comfort and Kelly). 
198. See id. at 799, 800–02, 287 P.3d at 573–74 (establishing principle and discussing Comfort). 
199. This book is the only academic source cited by either the lead opinion or  the  plaintiff’s  brief.  
See generally id., 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567; Brief of Respondent City of Wenatchee, 
Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (No. 86552-3). A search of 
common legal resources reveals no other sources asserting this proposition. Moreover, one can 
fairly  assume  that  if  other  sources  supported  the  plurality’s  fundamental  shift  then  they  would  have  
bolstered their position by position by citing additional sources.  
200. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572. 
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and misleading. 
i. Gillette Does Not View the Risk-of-Loss Principle as a Talisman 
for  All  of  Washington’s  Debt  Cases 
Gillette is only willing to support the idea that the risk-of-loss 
principle is, at best, a partial answer for when debt has been recognized 
in Washington. He acknowledges that his argument has limited 
explanatory powers: The   “[a]pplication   of   [the   risk-of-loss principle] 
brings a high, though by no means complete, degree of consistency to an 
otherwise  irreconcilable  body  of  cases”201 and  the  principle  “does  bring  
some order  to  the  [Court’s]  decisions.”202 Contrary  to  the  lead  opinion’s  
assertion, Gillette is not concluding that the risk-of-loss principle 
determines   when   an   obligation   triggers   Washington’s   debt   limits.203 
Rather, his conclusion is more nuanced; he believes the risk-of-loss 
principle can, at best, explain why the debt limit is triggered in some of 
the  Court’s  public  debt  cases.204 
ii. Errors  in  Gillette’s  Analysis  Undermine  His  Conclusion  that the 
Risk-of-Loss Principle Is Applicable 
Gillette’s   limited   explanation   of   Washington’s   public   debt   cases   is 
also problematic because it is based on incomplete and misleading 
analysis. First, he glosses over or ignores critical cases that are not 
explained by the proposed framework.205 He relegates Comfort to a 
footnote  with   a   “but   see”   citation   and   no   analysis—he does not try to 
explain how this case can be explained by the risk-of-loss principle and 
does not even address Kelly.206 Gillette does not offer an explanation 
because he cannot: The cases are not reconcilable with the risk-of-loss 
principle.207 Accordingly, his conclusion is clouded by selection bias—
                                                     
201. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. 
202. Id. § 4.1.2, at 169 (emphasis added).  
203. Compare id. (recognizing that the risk-of-loss  principle  does  not   fully   explain   the  Court’s  
opinions on debt), with Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572 
(summarizing  Gillette’s  position  as  “concluding  that  [Washington’s]  debt  limits  are  triggered  where  
the risk of project  failure  falls  on  the  taxpayers”).   
204. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. But even this conclusion is 
problematic because Gillette makes the same mistake as the plurality: conflating correlation with 
causation. He surveys Washington cases saying how the risk-of-loss principle could explain the 
results in those cases but never explains how the analysis in those cases supports the principle.  
205. See id. § 4.1.2, at 164–70. 
206. Id. § 4.1.2, at 167 n.17. 
207. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574. 
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effectively ignoring cases that challenge his analysis—that allows him to 
draw  inappropriate  conclusions  about  Washington’s  debt  law. 
Second, Gillette misrepresents Department of Ecology to manufacture 
stronger support for the risk-of-loss principle. He incorrectly asserts that 
the Court expressly relied on the principle.208 However, Gillette does not 
disclose that Department of Ecology’s   risk-of-loss discussion had 
limited-precedential value because it occurred in a plurality opinion.209 
He  ventures  beyond  mere  omission  because  he   inaccurately  states  “the 
majority opinion explicitly   based   its   decision   on   the   issue   of   risk.”210 
Without  this  statement,  Gillette’s  conclusion  about  Washington’s  use  of  
the risk-of-loss principle would have relied only on inferences—a 
weaker analytical tool—because the Court never explicitly addressed the 
principle before Department of Ecology.   Thus,   Gillette’s  
misrepresentation  of  the  case’s  nature  artificially  inflates  the  support  for  
his theory on the risk-of-loss principle. This misdirection underscores 
the weakness of his analysis for explaining a broad range of cases that 
Gillette   earlier   generally   referred   to   as   “irreconcilable”   and   decidedly  
“ad-hoc.”211 
2. The Court Should Reject the Risk-of-Loss Principle Because It 
Disregards the Common Origins of Article VIII 
The   lead   opinion’s   adoption   of   the   risk-of-loss principle is 
problematic  because  the  Court  has  indicated  other  jurisdictions’  analyses  
of debt provisions are persuasive and no other state has embraced the 
principle. Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court recognized the 
state’s   debt   limits   originated   as   part   of   a   national   trend   by   turning   to  
other  jurisdictions’  case  law  to  help  interpret  article  VIII  and  embracing  
principles used by other states. The absence of the risk-of-loss principle 
in these other jurisdictions suggests that the principle is not applicable to 
Washington’s  debt  limits. 
                                                     
208. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 168. 
209. See id. § 4.1.2, at 168; In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004) 
(stating plurality opinions are not binding). 
210. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 168 (emphasis added). Moreover, 
Gillette’s   book   was   published   in   1992,   which   was   before   the   State   Finance   Committee   cast  
significant doubt on Department of Ecology’s  scope  of   the  opinion.  See supra text accompanying 
note 194. 
211. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. 
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a. Washington and Other States Have Recognized the Common 
Origins of Their Debt Limits by Interpreting Them Similarly 
Given the common motivation for restricting government debt and the 
similar structure of the debt-limit provisions,212 it is unsurprising that 
courts in different jurisdictions have analyzed their debt limits by 
developing and applying relatively consistent principles. A fifty-state 
survey of municipal-debt-provision schemes shows the same principles 
have been applied by most of the states.213 For example, most states have 
created a lease-purchase exception, developed a special-fund doctrine, 
and recognized that contingent-liabilities are not debt.214 
Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court joined these other states 
in implicitly recognizing a harmony between constitutional-debt limits 
throughout the United States. Specifically, the Court signaled there was 
a   harmony   between  Washington’s   provisions   and   those   in   other   states  
by: (1) looking to other jurisdictions for guidance or support;215 and 
(2) using the same principles that were adopted in other states.216 This 
practice of interpreting article VIII by looking to other jurisdictions and 
applying similar principles indicates that the debt-limit provisions have 
not, and should not, be read without consideration of the practices in 
other states. 
b. The Lack of Risk-of-Loss Cases in Other States Supports the 
Conclusion that the Framework is Not Applicable to Article VIII 
Because the Court has indicated that the practices in other states are 
                                                     
212. Supra Part I.A.1–.2. 
213. See generally MISS BETTIE MANN & DR. FREDERICK L. BIRD, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL BORROWING AND PROPERTY TAXING POWERS (1964) (surveying each 
state and noting if they had recognized specific principles). 
214. See generally id. While there is some variance, courts generally agree on the basic principles 
and doctrines that apply—even if they are applied slightly differently depending on the jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Bisk, supra note 22, at 523–25 (explaining that there are a variety of approaches for lease-
purchase agreements).  
215. See, e.g., Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246, 256–57 & n.9, 804 P.2d 
1241, 1246 & n.9 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citing and discussing cases from Colorado, Florida, 
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, New Mexico, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
216. Compare id. at 255, 804 P.2d at 1245 (lease-purchase agreements), and Winston v. City of 
Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 526–27, 41 P. 888, 888 (1895) (special-fund doctrine), with Charles, W. 
Goldner, Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 925, 935–36 (1991) (acknowledging that lease-purchase agreements, the special-
fund doctrine, and other approaches have been embraced by state courts). See also MANN & BIRD, 
supra note 213 (detailing the debt principles adopted in every state). 
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instructive, the absence of the risk-of-loss principle in these states 
indicates  that  the  principle  is  not  applicable  to  Washington’s  debt  limits.  
A survey of other states indicates that no other state has adopted the risk-
of-loss principle to resolve constitutional-debt cases—Washington 
would be the first.217 Rather than adopting the principle, many states 
have adopted a mutually exclusive principle: the contingent-liability 
doctrine.218 Thus, the practice in other states suggests that the risk-of-
loss principle is not the correct framework for article VIII. To 
nonetheless adopt the principle, the Court would have to deny the 
common origins of article VIII and treat the provisions as novel. Such an 
approach   is   not   supported   by   the   Court’s   precedent   or   the   history   of  
article VIII. 
D. The Court Should Consider Adopting the Governmental 
Accounting  Standards  Board’s  Evaluation  of  Contingent  
Obligations to Evaluate Article VIII Debt 
If the Court declines to abandon categorizing CLAs as debt, the Court 
should consider evaluating these agreements by using the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board’s   (“GASB”)219 Generally Accepted 
Accounting   Principles   (“GAAP”)220 for nonexchange financial 
guaranties221 rather than the risk-of-loss principle. The GAAP provide 
standardized accounting standards for state and local governments 
                                                     
217. A search of traditional legal sources turned up no results, Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead  
opinion cited no authority that had reached a similar conclusion, and Gillette provides a relatively 
detailed analysis of the concept without citing or quoting from a case outside of Washington 
explicitly applying the concept. See generally Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 
P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1, at 160–70. 
218. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574 (explaining that the 
risk-of-loss principle and contingent-liability doctrine are incompatible); MCQUILLIN, supra note 
82, § 41.22 (recognizing that many states have adopted the contingent-liability doctrine). 
219. The  GASB  develops  the  United  States’  Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles  for  state  
and local governments. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT GASB 1 
(n.d.), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=GASB% 
2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176164672329 [hereinafter GASB FACTS]. 
220. While the GAAP is used outside the United States, this  Essay  will  use  “the  GAAP”  to  refer  
exclusively  to  the  GASB’s  version  that  only  addresses  practices  for  jurisdictions  within  the  United  
States. See GASB FACTS, supra note 219, at 1. 
221. This type of agreement is identical to the contingent liabilities addressed throughout this 
Essay:  A  party  agrees  to  pay  a  debtor’s  obligation  under  specific  conditions  without receiving value 
or approximately equal value in exchange for entering the agreement. See GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR NONEXCHANGE 
FINANCIAL GUARANTEES 2 (2013) [hereinafter GAAP GUARANTIES], available at 
http://gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176162551665&acceptedDiscl
aimer=true. 
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within the United States.222 Although governments are not required to 
follow the GAAP, the principles are widely used in Washington223 and 
nationwide.224 Since 1984, the GAAP have been established by the 
GASB—a non-profit private organization that develops the standards 
through an open process that invites public feedback and expert 
participation.225 The GASB produces a product analogous to the 
Financial   Accounting   Standards   Board’s   (FASB)   principles   governing  
the preparation of financial reports by nongovernmental entities; 
however,  the  GASB’s principles—unlike  the  FASB’s—are not officially 
recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.226 
The GAAP for nonexchange financial guaranties are set forth in 
GASB Statement 70 (“Statement 70”).227 The principles established in 
Statement 70 require a government abiding by the GAAP to recognize a 
liability for the amount that is likely to become owed on a contingent 
obligation. Specifically, each government must reassess its agreements 
each   year   and   recognize   a   liability   when   “qualitative factors228 and 
                                                     
222. Mission, Vision, and Core Values, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1175804850352 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2015); see also OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AND ACCOUNTING MANUAL 
Ch.   80.20.10   (2014)   (“Adherence   to   the   GAAP   provides   a   reasonable   degree   of   comparability  
among the financial reports  of  state  and  local  governmental  units.”).  
223. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.037 (2014) (adopting the GAAP for the state government); 
GAAP VERSUS CASH REPORTING, WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S OFFICE (n.d.), available at 
http://www.sao.wa.gov/resources/Documents/GAAP_Reporting_proscons.pdf (noting that twenty 
percent of local governments used the GAAP but that they are the largest and most complex 
governments). 
224.  See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., RESEARCH BRIEF: STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT USE OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR GENERAL PURPOSE 
EXTERNAL FINANCING REPORTING 1–2, 5 tbl.1 (2008), available at 
http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocu
ment_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176156726669 (estimating that between 62.27% and 
71.52% of state and local government entities follow the GAAP based on a sample that represents 
98% of all government revenue). 
225. GASB FACTS, supra note 219, at 1–2. 
226. Compare id. (explaining  that  the  GASB’s  GAAP  are  not  federal   laws  or  regulations),  with 
Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2015)  (explaining  the  FASB’s  standards  are  officially recognized by the SEC). 
227. GAAP GUARANTIES, supra note 221 (Statement 70); see GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., THE HIERARCHY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1–4 (2009), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/ 
Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176159972129&acceptedDisclaimer=true (establishing 
GASB Statements as the most authoritative source of the GAAP). 
228. Examples of qualitative factors include the debtor: (1) entering bankruptcy, (2) breaching the 
contract creating the underlying debt (e.g. not meeting covenants or defaults in payments), or 
(3) demonstrating signs of significant financial difficultly (e.g. drawing on reserve funds to make 
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historical data, if any, . . . indicate that it is more likely than not that the 
government  will  be  required  to  make  a  payment.”229 The liability would 
equal   “the   discounted   present   value   of   the   best   estimate   of   the   future  
outflows expected to  be  incurred.”230 
Statement 70 and its principles for nonexchange financial guaranties 
could be used in the article VIII context by counting the assessed 
liability as debt. There are three reasons why this approach would be 
preferable to the risk-of-loss principle embraced by Wenatchee Events 
Center’s   lead   opinion.   First,   in   contrast   to   the   lead   opinion’s   unclear  
treatment of contingent obligations,231 Statement 70 offers a clear 
standard that will be easier for the Court and municipalities to apply.232 
This is important for municipalities whose effectiveness depends, at least 
in part, on being able to understand what constitutes debt so that they 
can   determine   what   projects   can   be   pursued.   Second,   Statement   70’s  
standard protects municipal- and state-financial flexibility by facilitating 
the use of a common-funding mechanism without triggering the sudden 
and unexpected recognition of debt that is likely to occur under the risk-
of-loss framework.233 Preserving this flexibility comports with the 
Court’s   precedent,234 is consistent with national trends,235 and is 
important for the variety of projects that the state and municipalities 
frequently undertake.236 Third,   Statement   70’s   reliance   on   experts  
(accountants) creates a more accurate, nuanced perspective of debt—
recognizing it is only money that is, or is likely to become, due—rather 
than the more draconian all-or-nothing rule advanced by Wenatchee 
Events Center. 
                                                     
debt payments, seeking debt-holder concessions, incurring significant investment loses). GAAP 
GUARANTIES, supra note 221, at 3. 
229. Id. “[M]ore  likely  than  not”  means  a  likelihood  of  more  than  fifty  percent.  Id. at 4 n.2. 
230. Id. at 4. 
231. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the seemingly contradictory nature of the opinion and the 
lack of guidance for determining what percentage makes an obligation a guaranty rather than a 
contingent liability).  
232. In fact, the state is already applying this standard and many local governments are as well. 
See supra note 223. 
233. If the Court adopted the risk-of-loss principle in a majority opinion—removing any doubt 
about its applicability—there would likely be a sudden increase in the amount of debt recognized by 
municipalities. See supra note 2 (explaining the value of debt secured by existing CLAs). In fact, 
even the uncertainty about the treatment of CLAs has caused some municipalities to recognize more 
debt because of their existing CLAs. Supra note 21. 
234. See supra note 216 (highlighting the various exceptions recognized in Washington). 
235. Heil, supra note 28, at 86 (recognizing a national trend of courts approving methods for 
evading rigid limits). 
236. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Direct Review, supra note 2, at 11. 
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Statement 70 not only has these three distinct advantages over 
Wenatchee Events Center’s  risk-of-loss approach, but the statement also 
addresses   the   plurality’s   concern   about   CLAs:   municipalities  
guarantying debt without regard for their limits and then being forced to 
resort to taxes when the agreements suddenly came due.237 Under 
Statement 70, municipalities are unlikely to lightly enter into CLAs 
because the potential burden is not just an obligation to make a payment 
in the distant future but is also a present-day concern: part of the value 
can count against their debt limit each year. The likelihood that 
municipalities will enter into CLAs without careful deliberation is 
further  minimized  by  the  limited  volatility  introduced  by  Statement  70’s  
standard: Debt from CLAs will be added or subtracted annually based on 
the likelihood that a payment will have to be made.238 By creating the 
potential for a more immediate effect on the debt limit, Statement 70 
should encourage officials to thoroughly scrutinize a potential CLA 
rather than merely looking at the short-term  gains.  Thus,  Statement  70’s  
volatility responds to one of the concerns underlying debt restrictions: 
limiting the perverse incentive politicians have to enter into guaranties 
for short-term gain without regard for the potential long-term costs.239 
CONCLUSION 
Wenatchee Events Center’s  lead  opinion’s adoption of the risk-of-loss 
principle and treatment of contingent liabilities as debt are problematic. 
As soon as practicable and in an appropriate case, the Court should grant 
a petition for review addressing these topics because Wenatchee Events 
Center is unclear, has a broader than intended scope, and recognizes an 
incorrect   framework   for   public   debt.   The   lead   opinion’s   inconsistent  
treatment of contingent liabilities and failure to garner a majority means 
the opinion does not offer clear guidance to policy makers or courts. 
Beyond a lack of clarity, the opinion has a broader than intended scope 
because the attempt to compartmentalize the holding by limiting it to 
municipal debt—based   on   a   distinction   between   “debt”   and  
“indebtedness”—is not persuasive. Finally, the adoption of the risk-of-
loss principle—used to justify the treatment of contingent liabilities as 
debt—is not supported by case law, academics, or the origins of 
Washington’s  debt-limit provisions. 
                                                     
237. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 801–02, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012) (plurality 
opinion). 
238. GAAP GUARANTIES, supra note 221, at 4. 
239. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525. 
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After granting a petition for review, the Court should decline to adopt 
the risk-of-loss principle and instead provide a clear, easily applicable 
rule on contingent liabilities. This is important because the frequent use 
of CLAs as a funding mechanism makes clarity and predictability 
critical factors. In pursuit of this goal, the Court should look to the 
GAAP on nonexchange financial guaranties. This standard would 
require municipalities to annually evaluate their contingent liabilities and 
recognize debt for any amounts that are likely to become due. This 
approach is preferable because it balances clarity and flexibility with 
appropriate safeguards against improvident decision-making. 
In sum, the Court should address the problematic analysis adopted by 
Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   while   offering   a   clear   and  
binding rule about the status of contingent liabilities. One avenue to 
explore would be using the GAAP for nonexchange financial guaranties. 
 
